What can explain subnational variation in the persistence of informal welfare provi- sion despite the advent of social policy expansion in Latin America? To explain this variation, this paper will use discontinuities in the presence of coroneis, rural political bosses in Old Republic Brazilian municipalities, to examine the long-run effects of coronelismo on subsequent political and economic development. I argue that coronelismo’s influence has persisted through its effects on the presence of patron-client networks and informal welfare provision, elite capture, and economic growth. I argue that in municipalities that were historically governed by coroneis elites’, propensity to extend informal welfare as redistribution, despite ‘adequate’ social policy, is greater, patron- client networks are prevalent so the allocation of public goods cannot be disconnected from patron-client networks, and economic growth is low. To test these hypotheses, I propose using a geographic regression discontinuity design and an instrumental vari- ables approach. By exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in the presence of coron ́eis in Brazil, I may be able to explain subnational variation in the persistence of informal welfare as redistribution. This paper also has implications for explaining variation in non-programmatic redistribution across Latin America and other regions.
