Joan V. Joseph [she/they]


  • home
  • preanalysis
  • junior
  • tutorials
  • thesis
  • book
  • academia
  • twitter
  • cv

APRESENTAçãO FINAL



January 28, 2020





DIVERGENT LEGACIES OF BRITISH INDIRECT RULE
AND LONG-RUN DEVELOPMENT



December 19, 2018



What can explain subnational variation in the extent to which the effects of indirect rule persist on the African continent? To explain this variation, I propose a multi-dimensional theory of indirect rule which suggests that indirect rule is a local–level phenomenon, there is a gap between the theory of indirect rule, written by the British empire, and its manifestations on the ground, and that there is variation in the enforcement of indirect rule policies within states. I argue that the enforcement of indirect rule policies is conditioned on local administrative units’ ability to hinder the goals of indirect and on the dynamics of the principal–agent relationship between the colonial government and chief. Where administrative units were able to hinder the goals of the dual mandate and where the chief was not an effective agent– failed to prevent disturbances– and the colonial government had to intervene, the enforcement of indirect rule policies is greater which leads to variation in persistence. I propose three channels of persistence. The effect of variation in enforcement has persisted through its effects on the salience of ethnic identity, patron–client networks, and economic growth. To test these channels of persistence, I propose using a geographic regression discontinuity design and an instrumental variables approach. By exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in the enforcement of indirect rule policies I may be able to explain subnational variation in the persistence of indirect rule’s effects in former colonies.





The Persistent EFFects of Brazil’s Coronelismo



December 18, 2018





What can explain subnational variation in the persistence of informal welfare provi- sion despite the advent of social policy expansion in Latin America? To explain this variation, this paper will use discontinuities in the presence of coroneis, rural political bosses in Old Republic Brazilian municipalities, to examine the long-run effects of coronelismo on subsequent political and economic development. I argue that coronelismo’s influence has persisted through its effects on the presence of patron-client networks and informal welfare provision, elite capture, and economic growth. I argue that in municipalities that were historically governed by coroneis elites’, propensity to extend informal welfare as redistribution, despite ‘adequate’ social policy, is greater, patron- client networks are prevalent so the allocation of public goods cannot be disconnected from patron-client networks, and economic growth is low. To test these hypotheses, I propose using a geographic regression discontinuity design and an instrumental vari- ables approach. By exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in the presence of coron ́eis in Brazil, I may be able to explain subnational variation in the persistence of informal welfare as redistribution. This paper also has implications for explaining variation in non-programmatic redistribution across Latin America and other regions.



ORIGINS OF DEMOCRACY
AND THEIR VARIETIES



September 24, 2018





ECONOMIC GROWTH &
PERFORMANCE



September 17, 2018